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Abstract
We compute the optimal dynamic asset allocation policy for a retiree with
Epstein-Zin utility. The retiree can decide how much he consumes and how
much he invests in stocks, bonds, and annuities. Pricing the annuities we
account for asymmetric mortality beliefs and administration expenses. We
show that the retiree does not purchase annuities only once but rather several
times during retirement (gradual annuitization). We analyze the case in which
the retiree is restricted to buy annuities only once and has to perform a
(complete or partial) switching strategy. This restriction reduces both the
utility and the demand for annuities.
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search Foundation (DFG), the Fritz-Thyssen Foundation, and the German Investment and Asset
Management Association (BVI). Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors and not of the
institutions with whom the authors are aﬃliated.1 Introduction
Two major trends are responsible for the increasing public awareness of longevity
risk: ﬁrst, as nations move from public pay-as-you-go to privately funded pension
systems, the retiree himself becomes responsible for managing longevity risk over
his remaining lifetime. Second, employers are shifting from deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
plans to either hybrid or deﬁned contribution plans (DC). The constant payout life-
annuity is a bond-based investment with longevity insurance protecting the retiree
from outliving his resources (Mitchell et. al. 1999). Thus, life-annuities are almost
identical to public pensions with respect to their payout structure. Longevity in-
surance is possible because the insurer (insurance company or government) absorbs
the longevity risk by pooling many annuitants. Usually, annuity contracts guar-
antee constant life-long payments to the annuitant. No other form of retirement
withdrawal plan can oﬀer ﬁxed payments as long as the individual is alive with-
out exposing the individual to longevity risk. However, there are pitfalls related
to longevity insurance too. Once the money is spent on the annuity premium, the
retiree loses control over his funds and gives up ﬂexibility. Neither can the premium
can be transferred to his heirs nor can he stay ﬁnancially ﬂexible during retirement
to pay health expenditures or ﬁnance a motor yacht.
Political regulations of subsidized privately funded pensions do not agree on the
importance of longevity insurance. Some governments have mandated that tax-
qualiﬁed retirement saving plans include a mandatory annuity which begins after
a certain period. In the US, of course, annuitization is not compulsory for 401(k)
plans; as a result, most retirees roll them over to an Individual Retirement Account
and manage the funds themselves, subject to the tax laws requiring minimum dis-
tributions to begin at age 701
2. Other governments introduced tax sheltered and
subsidized savings plans as well while making annuitization compulsory at a certain
age. In the UK, accumulated assets had to be annuitized by age 75 (this rule expired
in April 2006). In Germany, ”Riester” plans oﬀer a tax inducement if life-annuity
payments start from age 85 on and the withdrawn amounts are either constant or
increasing prior to age 85. Therefore, it seems to be that governments want to have
simple and standardized rules for annuitization applied to a large, heterogeneous
group of retirees.
Theoretically, complete annuitization is only optimal for restrictive assumptions.
Yaari (1965) ﬁnds that all assets should be annuitized - given a single riskless asset,
actuarially fair annuity premiums, and no bequest motive.1 Davidoﬀ et al. (2005)
1Richard (1975) was the ﬁrst to include the uncertainty of the time of death in a continuous life-
cycle framework and to extend Merton’s (1971) model to include instantaneous term life insurance.
However, this framework lacks the realism of an actual insurance market because Richard (1975)
models instantaneous life insurance and annuity demand symmetrically.
1are more speciﬁc about the conditions for complete annuitization. As long as the
insurance market is complete and the return on the annuity is above the reference
asset, a retiree without a bequest motive completely annuitizes his entire wealth. If
the assumption of complete markets is relaxed or if there is a bequest motive then
partial annuitization becomes optimal.
A certain literature string on this topic has just compared the pros and cons of
alternative phased withdrawal plans versus life-annuities paying constant beneﬁts.
In this context, some studies compute the probability of running out of money before
the retirees uncertain date of death. Follow-on work by Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell
(2005) extended the previous research by quantifying risk and return proﬁles of ﬁxed
versus variable withdrawal strategies using a shortfall framework. A natural exten-
sion is whether retirees might beneﬁt from following a mixed strategy, where the
portfolio could possibly involve both a life-annuity and a withdrawal plan. Devolder
and Hainaut (2005) consider an initial annuitization strategy that mixes withdrawal
strategies and life-annuities contemporaneously, but do not allow for deferring an-
nuitization into future periods. Therefore, part of the literature comes up with the
search for the optimal time to switch from withdrawal plans to life-annuities and
hence allows for mixing withdrawal plan and life-annuities not contemporaneously
but inter-temporally. In this context, complete switching strategies entirely use the
remaining funds of a withdrawal plan to purchase a life-annuity. The recommenda-
tion of these studies is to switch to annuities at a certain point during retirement,
usually if the mortality credit exceeds the equity premium. Milevsky and Young
(2002) and Kingston and Thorp (2005), for instance, also try to explain the annuity
puzzle describing empirically low levels of annuitization by introducing the real op-
tion to delay annuitization. In fact, the authors calculate the optimal deterministic
time to switch completely to an annuity while following optimal investment and
consumption policies before the actual switching time. Blake et al. (2003) estimate
the optimal deterministic and stochastic switching times to completely shift from
investments in bonds and stocks to constant real life-annuities, while Stabile (2003)
exclusively focuses on stochastic switching times (a.k.a. stopping times to switch
to annuities). Optimal switching times to annuities are also investigated in a short-
fall framework when the retiree self-annuitizes his portfolio prior to switching to an
annuity (see Milevsky, Moore, and Young, 2006).2
Contrary to the previous switching literature, Kapur and Orszag (1999) and
Milevsky and Young (2003), and Horneﬀ, Maurer, and Stamos (2006) investigate
gradual annuitization strategies.3 Gradual annuitization refers to the strategy whereby
2Blake et al. (2003) solve the combined optimal control and stopping time problem in discrete
time by relying on numerical methods. Milevsky et al. (2006) and Stabile (2003) solved this
problem in a continuous time setting by restating it as a variational inequality.
3Kapur and Orszag (1999) and Milevsky and Young (2003) assume time-additive CRRA pref-
2a retiree can purchase annuities several times during retirement. The retiree should
gradually annuitize his wealth meaning that he should purchase annuities with a
certain part of his wealth several times during retirement in order to have the opti-
mal tradeoﬀ between the inﬂexibility of annuities and the longevity insurance they
oﬀer.
Recent research referring to annuitization has not yet considered the impact of
regulatory restrictions vis-` a-vis the theoretically optimal annuitization strategy. Our
goal is to examine the utility losses and the eﬀects on the demand for annuities caused
by imposing switching restrictions. Besides complete switching we also want to
introduce as a novelty partial switching strategies which allow for mixing withdrawal
plans and life-annuities contemporaneously. In this framework we allow annuities to
be purchased only once too. We show how a retiree optimally consumes, (dis-)saves,
and purchases annuities in the following three cases: complete switching, partial
switching, and gradual annuitization. We consider the following liquid assets: risky
stocks and riskless bonds. The inﬂexibility or illiquidity of annuities is modeled by
imposing the restriction that the retiree cannot sell previously purchased annuities.
We assume that the retiree’s utility function is of the Epstein/Zin (1989) form, he
possibly has a bequest motive, and faces borrowing restrictions. By resorting to
numerical backward optimization, we derive the optimal policies.
We estimate the utility loss of switching strategies for a retiree with and without
a bequest motive. Thereby, we also consider a scenario in which annuity markets
do not exist (pure withdrawal plan) and a scenario in which the retiree is forced to
purchase annuities with all of his wealth initially (initial annuitization). While utility
losses for the partial and the complete switching strategies are still high with respect
to gradual annuitization, the losses of those strategies are much lower compared to
the losses related to the pure withdrawal plan or the initial annuitization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
discrete time model, the individual’s preferences and explains the diﬀerent annuiti-
zation strategies. Section 3 shows the optimal asset allocation policy for the bequest
and no-bequest case. Section 4 reports the results from Monte Carlo simulations
and from a comparative welfare analysis before section 5 concludes.
erences without bequest motives and labor/pension income. Kapur and Orszag’s (1999) model
does only account for tontines while Milevsky and Young’s (2003) also accounts for inﬂexible
life-annuities. Therefore, the ﬁrst one resembles a standard stochastic control problem, whereas
Milevsky and Young’s (2003) is of the barrier control type. Horneﬀ, Maurer, and Stamos (2006)
have analyzed the optimal life-annuity demand and the welfare gains from annuities taking into
account the entire life-cycle of an individual with Epstein/Zin preferences, bequest motives, and
uninsurable labor income.
32 The Model
In this section, we introduce the model we apply to the problems identiﬁed in the
previous paragraph. First, we deﬁne the individual’s preferences and then we will
introduce the three possible annuitization strategies: gradual annuitization, partial
switching, and complete switching.
We consider a retiree turning 65 in t = 0 who has a constant retirement income
Y and initial retirement-savings of S0. We truncate the retiree’s maximum age to
100 in T = 36. Hence, we have t ∈{ 0,...,T +1 } because the retiree leaves estate
to his heirs in T + 1. The retiree has a subjective probability ps
t that he survives
until t + 1 given that he is alive in t. Furthermore, the individual is characterized
through Epstein-Zin utility deﬁned over a single non-durable consumption good.
Let Ct be the consumption level and Bt be the bequest at time t. Then Epstein-Zin
preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989) are described by
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where ρ is the level of relative risk aversion (RRA), ψ is the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (EIS), β is the discount factor and k the strength of the
bequest motive. Since ps
T = 0 equation (1) reduces in T to
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which gives us the terminal condition.
2.1 Gradual Annuitization Strategy
The gradual annuitization strategy is the most general case we consider in our analy-
sis. It refers to the intertemporal asset allocation problem among equity, bonds, and
life-annuities as well as the consumption choice of a ﬁnite horizon long-lived agent
in a setting in which the annuities purchased to date provide constant payments for
the individual’s remaining lifetime, but additional annuities can be purchased over
time. Each year t the retiree can use his wealth on hand Wt to consume Ct, to buy
stocks St and bonds Mt, and to purchase life-annuities PR t. Therefore, the budget
constraint is
Wt = Ct + St + Mt + PR t. (2)
4The next year’s wealth on hand Wt+1 comprises the public pension income Y ,t h e
new value of the last-period stock investment StRt+1 and the bond investments
MtRf and the payouts of all previously purchased life-annuities Lt+1:
Wt+1 = Y + StRt+1 + MtRF + Lt+1, (3)
where Rt denotes the real risky stock return and Rf the real bond gross return. The
risky stock return is assumed to be i.i.d. lognormal distributed with the expected
return μ and volatility σ. The purchase of the annuity with the amount PR t delivers
constant payouts Pt
Pt = PR t/at,
where the annuity factor at is given by
at =( 1+δ)
∞  
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u are the survival probabilities used by the life-annuity provider and δ is the expense
factor. Since these probabilities can be diﬀerent from the retiree’s ones, we are
then able to model asymmetric mortality beliefs. The constant payout life-annuity
is an asset class with a distinctive return proﬁle, as payments are conditional on
the annuitants survival. The capital of those who die is allocated across surviving
members of the cohort. Accordingly, a survivors one-period total return from an
annuity is a function of his capital return on the assets plus a mortality credit.
Other things equal, the older the individual, the higher is the mortality credit, i.e.
the higher is the compensation for the inﬂexibility of the life-annuity.
In t + 1 the sum of all payouts from previously purchased annuities is
Lt+1 =
t  
i=0
Pi. (4)
At this point we want to highlight our assumption that the investor is not restricted
to use annuity payouts for consumption purposes only, as in Blake et al. (2003),
Milevsky and Young (2002), Kingston and Thorp (2005), and Stabile (2003). The
investor has the full ﬂexibility to decide on how to spend the annuity payouts. They
can be used to consume, to purchase bonds or stocks or even to purchase additional
annuities. Furthermore, we impose borrowing constraints:
Mt,S t,PR t ≥ 0, (5)
since we do not allow the investor to borrow against future pension income and
5to sell life-annuities. Hence, from the individual’s perspective, the premium paid
initially cannot be recovered. If the retiree dies, bequest Bt will be given by the
remaining ﬁnancial wealth Bt+1 = MtRf + StRt+1 since annuity payouts cannot be
transferred to his heirs.
2.2 Partial Switching Strategy
Partial switching limits the freedom of choice given in the gradual annuitization
strategy. The partial switching restriction urges the retiree to purchase annuities
only once but gives him the freedom to decide how much wealth he shifts to annuities.
Thus, let τ denote the stochastic stopping time at which the switching takes place.
Then, we can add the following restriction to the model. If switching took place
in an earlier period, no further annuity purchases would be allowed for periods to
come:
PR t =0 ∀t>τ .
Then the budget restrictions (2) and (3) can be restated as
Wt =
 
Ct + St + Mt + PR t ,t ≤ τ
Ct + St + Mt ,t > τ
(6)
Wt+1 = Y + StRt+1 + MtRf +
 
0 ,t ≤ τ
Pτ ,t > τ
. (7)
Again, annuity payouts can be used not only to consume but also to purchase
bonds and stocks.
2.3 Complete Switching Strategy
If complete switching is imposed, further restrictions have to be added. If the retiree
decides to switch, no investments into stocks and bonds will be allowed any longer.
Therefore, we have to add to the above restriction the following ones:
St,M t =0 ∀t ≥ τ (8)
Thus, once the retiree decides to switch he has to shift all his savings into an-
nuities and he has to use all annuity payouts for consumption purposes only. From
then on his consumption stream is deterministic:
Ct = Pτ + Y ∀t ≥ τ.
6Plugging the restriction (8) into (6) and (7) leads to
Wt = Ct +
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
St + Mt ,t < τ
PR T ,t = τ
0 ,t > τ
Wt+1 = Y +
 
StRt+1 + MtRf ,t < τ
Pτ ,t ≥ τ
.
2.4 Numerical Solution
Each year the retiree must choose how much he consumes, saves in stocks and bonds,
and to what extent he buys life- annuities. Thereby, he maximizes his life-time
utility under consideration of the corresponding budget restrictions as well as the
short-selling restrictions. We use the public pension income to normalize the state
and policy variables. The normalized variables are denoted as lower case letters.
The optimal policy depends on three state variables: normalized cash on hand wt ,
normalized annuity payouts from previously purchased annuities lt and age t. Since
an analytic solution to this type of problem does not exist to our knowledge, we
use dynamic programming techniques to maximize the value function by backward
induction.
We solve the problems in a three-dimensional state space by backward induction.
For solving the gradual annuitization and partial switching problem the continuous
state variables wealth on hand wt and annuity payouts lt have to be discretized and
the only discrete state variable is age t. For each grid point we calculate the optimal
policy and the value of the value function. Thereby, the expectation operator in (1)
is computed by resorting to Gaussian quadrature integration and the optimization
is done by numerical constrained minimization. We derive the policy functions for
gradual annuitization (i=GA) and partial switching (i=PS), si(w,l,t), mi(w,l,t),
pri(w,l,t), ci(w,l,t) and the value function vi(w,l,t) by cubic-splines interpolation.
For solving the complete switching problem we can omit the state annuity pay-
outs l but have to introduce an indicator variable I which is 1 if the retiree decides
to switch and 0 otherwise. For each combination of wealth and age in the grid we
compute the optimal utility for the case that the retiree switches and that he does
not switch. The policy delivering a higher utility is then the optimal one. In the
case of switching, utility is trivial to compute since ct, st, mt,a n dbt are constant
from that time on. In the case of no switching the value function is computed by
using cubic splines interpolation. The policy function is then given by si(w,I,t),
mi(w,I,t), pri(w,I,t), and ci(w,I,t).4
4The numerical optimization in the 3 dimensional grid for the gradual annuitization and partial
switching case is done in the matter of hours and in the complete switching case with only 2
d i m e n s i o n a lg r i di ti sd o n ei nam a t t e ro fm i n u t e so nas t a n d a r dp e r s o n a lc o m p u t e rw i t hP e n t i u m
IV processor and 2,400 Mhz using Matlab.
73 Optimal Annuitization and Asset Allocation
Policies
3.1 Without Bequest Motives
This section shows the optimal policy for each annuitization strategy and displays
the annuity purchases as well as stock and bond investments for the case without
a bequest motive. We choose the following preference parameters: coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion ρ = 3, elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ =0 .2, discount
factor β =0 .96, and bequest weight k = 0. We set the real interest rate Rf to 2
percent, the equity premium μ−Rf to 4 percent and stock volatility σ to 18 percent,
which is in line with the recent life-cycle literature. The expense factor δ is set to 7.3
percent for male annuitants.5 The retiree’s and the annuitant’s survival probabilities
are taken from the 2000 Population Basic mortality table and the 1996 US Annuity
2000 Aggregate Basic respectively.
The optimal policies for annuity purchases are depicted in ﬁgure 1. All four
graphs show the optimal annuity purchases as a function of current age and normal-
ized wealth.
The upper left graph reﬂects the complete switching case. The barrier at which
the investor completely annuitizes separates the age-wealth space into two regions.
The higher the wealth the earlier the retiree wants to shift his accumulated wealth
to life-annuities. If the wealth remains low, annuitization will never become opti-
mal. Since the retiree can only choose between a liquid stock/bond portfolio and
illiquid life-annuities exclusively, he switches to annuities rather late. Annuitization
is postponed because the decision is reduced to a mutually exclusive investment
decision.
In the no-annuitization region the need for staying ﬂexible and the desire to
gain the equity premium is predominant for the retiree. On the ﬂip side, in the
annuitization region, the retiree wants to avoid the risk of not consuming his wealth
entirely and of leaving bequest behind in case he dies. At the same time he wants
to hedge himself against longevity risk. Due to the restriction he is not able to
optimally exploit the advantages of annuities while maintaining a partially liquid
portfolio.
If we allow for partial switching the pattern of annuitization is very similar to the
case of complete switching as the upper right hand graph shows. However, the retiree
starts switching earlier but with less wealth. If normalized wealth is suﬃciently high,
he will even switch at the beginning of his retirement phase (age 65). Overall, the
5This factor is taken from the 1995 annuity value per premium dollar computed on an after tax
basis by Mitchell et al. (1999). We refer the interested reader to this article for a greater discussion
of the explicit and implicit costs related to annuities.
8Figure 1: Optimal Annuity Purchases for Males with RRA =3 ,k =0 ,a n dEIS =
0.2. Upper left graph: complete switching case. Upper right graph: partial switching
case. Lower left graph: gradual annuitization case (l = 0). Lower right graph:
gradual annuitization case with previously purchased annuities (l =1 /3).
annuitization region in the age-wealth space is much larger compared to the complete
switching case.
If we allow for gradual annuitization, the ﬁrst time the retiree purchases annuities
will be slightly before the initial purchase in the case of partial switching. He starts
annuitizing low amounts of wealth compared to the more restrictive cases because
he has the opportunity to purchase annuities later in life. The fourth graph depicts
the case in which he has previously bought annuities paying one third of his yearly
pension income. One can infer that the retiree still has demand for annuities. The
demand is slightly lower than in the case in which he has not purchased annuities
previously.
The optimal asset allocation policies for stocks and bonds are displayed in ﬁgure
2. The structural brakes in the optimal policies for stocks and bonds in the switching
cases reﬂect the stopping times when the retiree switches to annuities. The optimal
mix between bonds, stocks, and annuities consists actually mainly of stocks and
annuities in all cases. The optimal stock exposure shrinks with age which is in line
with popular investment recommendations promoted by many policy makers and
9Figure 2: Optimal Allocation to Stocks (left column) and Bonds (right column)
for Males with RRA =3 ,k =0 ,a n dEIS =0 .2. The upper, middle, and lower
graphs correspond to the complete switching, partial, and gradual annuitization
case, respectively.
10Figure 3: Optimal Annuity Purchases for Males with RRA =3 ,k =1 ,a n dEIS =
0.2. Left graph: partial switching case. Right graph: gradual annuitization case
(l =0 ) .
ﬁnancial planners. The reasons for the high equity fractions are manifold. First, we
consider an investor with a relatively low risk aversion. Second, the mortality credit
of annuities makes the bond yield appear less attractive. Hence, annuities replace
bonds over time. Third, during the retirement period human capital represents the
present value of the riskless pension income. Then, human capital is an implicit
annuity holding because it perfectly resembles its payout structure and replaces
bond demand. Fourth, in the case of complete switching the investor has to fully
switch to annuities. Therefore, the retiree allocates his accumulated wealth mainly
in stocks while anticipating the complete switch in the riskless annuity. At the same
time he can also satisfy his risk appetite. In general, the stock exposure does not
rise proportionally with wealth because annuities are purchased whenever a certain
wealth level is reached.
3.2 With Bequest Motives
Introducing bequest motives has substantial eﬀects on both the retiree’s asset allo-
cation and consumption strategy. This is because the retiree wants to have suﬃcient
liquid ﬁnancial wealth which he can bequeath in case he dies. Thus, he will align his
policy in so far as he will never exhaust his entire savings. So he can always transfer
liquid wealth if he dies. The more formal reason is that the marginal utility from
leaving bequest becomes inﬁnite if bequest converges to 0. The bequest motive mit-
igates the demand for annuities since annuity payment claims are not transferable
to one’s heirs (see Bernheim, 1991).
In a complete switching setting, a retiree with a bequest motive opts for a with-
drawal plan exclusively. Our results are in line with the recent recommendations
as far as the complete switching case is concerned. The retiree basically ignores
11Figure 4: Optimal Allocation to Stocks (Left Column) and Bonds (Right Column)
for Males with RRA =3 ,k =1 ,a n dEIS =0 .2. The upper, middle, and lower
graphs correspond to the complete switching, partial, and gradual annuitization
case, respectively.
12the existence of annuity markets and chooses to invest only in stocks and bonds
since he is only allowed to buy annuities with all his savings. This would reduce
the bequest potential to zero. An exogenously complete switching restriction hence
entirely prohibits the retiree from purchasing annuities and from gaining utility in
the presence of annuity markets.
With the partial switching restriction (ﬁgure 3) the retiree buys annuities giving
up a substantial fraction of his wealth. The remaining wealth is consumed and
invested in liquid stocks and bonds. Holding liquid assets allows the retiree to
transfer estate to his heirs. Contrary to the complete switching case, the retiree
can gain utility from the existence of annuity markets although he has a bequest
motive. In the gradual switching case he again purchases annuities several times
during retirement. The demand for annuities in all the three cases is lower than
in the case without a bequest motive but remains at a high level in the partial
switching and gradual annuitization case.
The optimal asset allocation policy for all cases is given in ﬁgure 4. The demand
for stocks shrinks with age similar to the no-bequest case due to the decrease of
the human capital. Overall, the demand for stocks and bonds is higher than in
the no-bequest case in order to be able to bequeath to his heirs. Especially, bonds
enable the retiree to plan his bequest with a higher precision because the related
bond return is certain. While life-annuities oﬀer a higher return than bonds due
to their increasing mortality credit, the retiree now prefers the lower return of the
bonds to the life-annuities because he wants to keep liquid wealth instead.
4 Results from Monte Carlo Simulations
4.1 Expected Decumulation Proﬁles without Bequest
We carry out Monte Carlo simulations by generating 100,000 life-cycle trajectories
for the base-line case. We assume that the retiree’s savings are 10 times the pension
income at the beginning of his decumulation phase. Hence, his entire accumulated
wealth at age 65 is 11 times his pension income. He consumes and invests his wealth
according to the optimal policy functions derived in the preceding section. Figure 5
shows the retiree’s expected decumulation proﬁles for gradual annuitization, partial
switching, and complete switching.
Starting from age 71 on annuity purchases occur rather late in the complete
annuitization setting, whereas annuities are bought from age 66 on (see also ﬁgure
1) in other settings. These annuity purchases deliver additional payments allowing
to consume even at very high ages (> 90) considerably more than the regular pension
income. The retiree consumes more when he is young as he expects to gain more
13Figure 5: Decumulation Proﬁles for Males with RRA =3a n dEIS =0 .2. The
upper panel depicts the case without bequest motive (k = 0) and the lower the case
with one (k = 1). Left graph: complete switching. Middle graph: partial switching.
Right graph: gradual annuitization. The dashed, dotted, solid and solid/asterisk
lines reﬂect expected savings, consumption, pension income (life-annuity and public
pension) and annuity purchases, respectively.
utility from early consumption since he weighs future utility from consumption with
survival probabilities. At age 65 he consumes almost twice his pension income and
in turn reduces wealth by 8 percent from 10 to 9.2. In expectation consumption
is quite high because accumulated wealth is fully invested in stocks delivering high
expected returns. Savings (dashed line) decline most rapidly in the case of gradual
annuitization (right graph) becoming exhausted by age 87. In the other cases the
exhaustion of savings occurs later at age 91 since the retiree is not allowed to buy
annuities if he did it once before.
4.2 Expected Decumulation Proﬁles with Bequest
In order to analyze the implications of the bequest motive we run 100,000 Monte
Carlo simulations in which we use the newly calculated optimal policies. We again
assume that the retiree’s savings are 10 times the pension income at the beginning
of his decumulation phase. He consumes and invests his wealth according to the
optimal policy functions derived in the preceding section. Figure 6 shows the re-
14Figure 6: Box Plot of Savings for the Bequest and No-Bequest Case. The upper
graph corresponds to the no-bequest case and the lower one to the bequest case.
tiree’s expected decumulation proﬁles for gradual annuitization, partial switching,
and complete switching.
The left graph corresponds to the complete switching case that is degenerated
to a pure phased withdrawal plan as explained above. The middle (partial an-
nuitization) and right graph (gradual annuitization) show that in expectation the
annuity demand is substantially weaker than in the no-bequest case while the tim-
ing of annuity purchases remains similar. Again, the window for optimal annuity
purchases is narrower in the partial switching than in the gradual switching case.
Throughout the retirement period the individual keeps higher liquid savings than
in the no-bequest case to be able to bequeath wealth in case he dies.
4.3 Distribution of Savings and Consumption
For the gradual annuitization case, the distribution of liquid savings over time is
presented in ﬁgure 6 as a box plot. In the case with a bequest motive it has a higher
level and larger variation than in the case without it. Dis-saving occurs slower in the
bequest-case than in the no-bequest case. This can also lead to increasing savings
for some random paths, e.g. until age 78 it is still likely that savings are higher than
the initial savings in the bequest-case. Even in the 1 percent worst case the retiree
can transfer substantial wealth, falling hardly below his yearly pension income, to
15Figure 7: Box Plot of Consumption for the Bequest and No-Bequest Case. The
upper graph corresponds to the no-bequest case and the lower one to the bequest
case.
his heirs.
The distribution of consumption over the retirement phase is presented in ﬁgure 7
as a box plot. The overall shape of the consumption distributions over the retirement
period is similar. The overall level of consumption in both cases declines with age.
The variability of consumption in the case with bequest is higher since the retiree
never uses his entire savings mainly invested in stocks and reacts to diﬀerent wealth
states. Even though he retiree in the no-bequest case uses his liquid wealth up by age
87, his consumption remains constant above the pension income because he receives
constant payouts from previously purchased annuities hedging longevity risk. The
level of consumption from this age on is equal to his pension plus annuity income.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
The substantial demand for annuities suggests that considerable utility gains can be
generated through the presence of annuity markets in general and hedging longevity
risk is important for the retiree. Governments have an intrinsic motivation to pro-
mote longevity insurance: ﬁrst, insurance products can avoid old-age poverty that
might otherwise burden the social safety net; second, governments can also be inter-
ested in reducing intergenerational transfers to limit divergence in aggregate wealth
distribution.
16Regulation of privately funded pension systems can either leave the annuitization
decision entirely up to the retiree or can establish mandatory annuitization guide-
lines. The ﬁrst idea suggests that the individual is prudent enough to decide in a
responsible manner about hedging longevity risk himself, while the second approach
assumes that regulation is necessary to bring the advantages to the forefront. In
this context, it is desirable to have simple and feasible annuitization rules that can
be applied to a large, heterogeneous group of retirees.
While in the US annuitization is voluntary for tax sheltered retirement saving
plans (401 K), some European governments introduced tax sheltered and subsidized
plans making annuitization compulsory at a certain age. For instance, in the UK,
accumulated assets had to be annuitized by age 75 prior to April 2006. In Germany,
”Riester” plans oﬀer a tax inducement if life-annuity payments start from age 85
on and the withdrawn amounts are either constant or increasing prior to age 85.
Both examples involve switching savings to annuities at a particular age that is the
same for all annuitants. In the optimal policy section, we showed that the switching
age depends not only on the retiree’s preference but also on the level of savings. In
general, switching strategies seem to comprise the necessary simplicity needed for
regulating privately funded pensions systems. The complete and partial switching
strategies we analyzed give more freedom in the sense that retiree can choose the
switching age.
In the previous asset allocation section, we have seen that annuity demand is
weakened by exogenously imposed switching regulation and annuitization is post-
poned or even circumvented. Exogenously imposed restrictions could cause con-
siderable utility losses making annuity investments look less attractive compared
to the unrestricted case. Therefore, the switching strategy sets counterproductive
incentives for annuitization.
In order to quantify the utility loss, we conduct a welfare analysis similar to
Mitchell et al. (1999). To benchmark results we include pure withdrawal plans
and initial annuitization into our analysis. We compute the equivalent losses in
ﬁnancial wealth for every age relative to gradual annuitization in order to measure
the expected utility losses in monetary terms. Apparently, the expected utility is
always higher for individuals who can voluntarily purchase annuities. The equivalent
loss in ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as the reduction in savings implied by following
a restricted policy. Therefore, we equate the expected utility values of retirees
with and without restrictions as far as annuitization is concerned by lowering the
individuals’ ﬁnancial wealth in the gradual annuitization case.
Table 1 displays the equivalent losses in savings for four suboptimal annuitization
strategies. To calculate the equivalent losses, we use the optimal policies derived in
the optimal policy section for both the bequest and no-bequest case. Overall, losses
17Partial Complete Withdrawal Annuity
Switching Switching Plan at Age 65
Age 65 75 65 75 65 75 65 75
No Bequest 2.12 20.07 2.54 22.14 2.99 27.94 12.85 26.61
Bequest 3.64 38.57 5.97 42.76 5.97 42.76 n/a n/a
Table 1: Equivalent Loss in Financial Wealth for Diﬀerent Suboptimal Strategies
Compared to Gradual Annuitization.
are of substantial magnitude, especially at age 75 after following the suboptimal
strategies for 10 years. Losses are higher for the complete switching than for the
partial switching case which is in line with adding more restrictions. If the retiree
has a bequest motive, losses turn out to be almost twice as high as in the no-bequest
case. The withdrawal plan performs worse than the switching strategies except for
the bequest case in which the complete switching strategy is equal to the phased
withdrawal plan. While the initial annuitization strategy appears to be the worst
among all suboptimal strategies at age 65, the loss becomes smaller than the one of
the withdrawal plan at age 75.
5 Conclusion
Initial switching, and gradual annuitization strategies have only been treated sepa-
rately in the insurance literature so far. We compare all cases in terms of annuity
demand, asset allocation and welfare. In addition, partial switching that has not
been considered in the previous literature is introduced. Our paper also contributes
to the literature by accounting for non-additive utility and bequest motives.
We ﬁnd that the retiree seeks longevity insurance even if he has a bequest motive.
Optimally, the retiree prefers purchasing annuities several times to switching to
annuities only once. In the bequest case, the retiree always keeps a certain amount
of liquid savings. Our analysis shows that the introduction of switching restrictions
has substantial eﬀects on both annuity demand and welfare. Switching restrictions
cause the annuitization age to be postponed and the overall demand for annuities
to be weaker. If the retiree has a bequest motive, the annuity demand will vanish
completely for the complete switching case. The recent literature uses this result as
a possible explanation for the empirically low annuity demand (annuity puzzle).
Our welfare analysis supports that the presence of life-annuities hedging longevity
risk is valuable to the retiree. Switching restrictions produce welfare losses equiv-
alent to a decrease in ﬁnancial wealth of up to 5.97 percent at age 65 and up to
42.76 percent at age 75. The welfare analysis also shows that the simple initial,
complete, and even our newly introduced partial switching strategies lead to severe
18utility losses especially if the individual gets old. Considering the utility losses is
essential since most of the recent research on the accumulation period as well as
the decumulation period has exogenously imposed one of the simpliﬁed annuitiza-
tion strategies. Also from a policy viewpoint, it is important to account for the
utility losses because some governments have already mandated that tax-qualiﬁed
retirement saving plans include a mandatory annuitization. In light of our results, it
seems to be somewhat questionable whether governments should impose restrictions
on annuitization exogenously.
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